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A recent poll reported that support for the First Amendment has
eroded significantly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.'
The Department of Justice is actively considering a program under
which everyone is encouraged to become an informant to the gov-
ernment against everyone else. A Secret Service agent of Arabic de-
scent was refused permission to board a commercial air flight, because
the pilot thought that he was potentially dangerous.' And the courts
are being asked to hold secret hearings, to sanction indefinite deten-
tions of people whose identities are not revealed, and to draw sharp
distinctions between the human rights to be accorded to U.S. citizens
and to "aliens," whether the latter are legally present in the country or
not.4
Whatever may justify any or all of those attitudes, decisions, and
policies, it is fair to say that they represent a departure from the norms
to which Americans have become accustomed in the last fifty years.
They call into question the balance between individual rights and ex-
ecutive decisions undertaken in the name of state security. More fun-
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer
in Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
I See Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, The Ideas Industry, Wash Post A15 (Sept 3,
2002) (The poll, released by the University of Connecticut's Center for Survey Research and
Analysis, showed that a whopping 49 percent of the public now thinks that the First Amendment
"goes too far," up from 39 percent in 2001 and 22 percent in 2000.).
2 The Department of Justice introduced the idea for Operation TIPS (Terrorism Informa-
tion and Prevention System) in January 2002 to "enlist the help of millions of American workers
who, in the daily course of their work, are in a unique position to serve as extra eyes and
ears for law enforcement." Citizen Corps: A Guide for Local Officials, online at http://
www.citizencorps.gov/council.pdf (visited Dec 2, 2002). In response to privacy concerns, the De-
partment of Justice is reportedly no longer planning to extend the program to mail carriers, util-
ity workers, and other workers who have access to people's homes. See Dan Eggen, Under Fire,
Justice Shrinks TIPS Program, Wash Post Al (Aug 10, 2002).
3 See Colbert I. King, Something in the Air on Flight 363, Wash Post A21 (Jan 5, 2002) (dis-
cussing an incident in which a seven-year veteran of the Secret Service was removed from an
American Airlines flight, possibly because of his Arabic descent).
4 See President Issues Military Order: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/11/20011113-27.html (visited Dec 2,2002) (detailing the executive order that set up
military tribunals and submitted detention of aliens to the discretion of the Secretary of De-
fense); Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Executive Decisions; A Penchant for Secrecy, NY
Times § 4 at 1 (May 5, 2002) (noting litigation over the refusal to release names of detainees).
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damentally, they call into question the extent to which any society can
adhere to the rule of law when it perceives itself to be threatened by
hostile powers or groups. To some eyes, the rule of law has begun to
look like a luxury item that one buys in times of plenty, but that one
cuts from the budget in times of want. To others, the rule of law takes
on a heightened importance in times of stress, even if it is more costly
to uphold, because to relinquish law is to lose our most precious lega-
cies of freedom and democracy.
This Essay offers some modest reflections on the nature of a so-
ciety that respects the rule of law, the extent to which the United
States has followed rule-of-law principles in earlier times of stress, and
the tensions that we are experiencing at present. As the Executive
Branch of the federal government uses the rhetoric of war to describe
its efforts to root out and conquer terrorism, it has already waged one
real war in Afghanistan, and it is urging a second real war against Iraq.
While many more facts may become known to us as these efforts un-
fold, it will be important constantly to keep in mind what is at stake,
what is (and is not) new in the world situation we now face, and what
role each of our democratic institutions should play. The United States
has always been a work-in-progress, and now more than ever it is vital
that we live up to our commitments to the rule of law, and, in the
words proclaimed above the doors of the U.S. Supreme Court, to
Equal Justice Under Law.
I. THE RULE OF LAW
Numerous scholars have discussed the idea of the "rule of law,"
and it is far beyond the scope of this Essay to add anything original to
the debate.' It will suffice to identify some common themes that ap-
pear to reflect a consensus view. Most people distinguish at the outset
between the "rule of law" and the "rule of men."7 Professor Rosenfeld
elaborates on that negative definition of the rule of law:
5 The existence of the latter group is illustrated by the fact that membership in the ACLU
has increased significantly since the attacks of September 11, 2001; out of 330,000 dues-paying
members, 50,000 joined after that date. See Ron Kampeas, ACLU Sees Membership Surge after
9/11,2002 WL 103441808 (AP Online Dec 1, 2002).
6 For a general discussion, see Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of
Constitutional Democracy, 74 S Cal L Rev 1307 (2001) (examining the rule of law in an Anglo-
American common law system); David Dyzenhaus, ed, Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of
Legal Order (Oxford 1999) (examining the law under stress, the reconception of the rule of law,
and the limits of legal order); Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 Notre
Dame L Rev 1691 (1999); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 Colum L Rev 1 (1997).
7 See Rosenfeld, 74 S Cal L Rev at 1313 n 25 (cited in note 6) (noting that even the Su-
preme Court in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), distinguishes between the
"government of laws" and the "government of men"); Fallon, 97 Colum L Rev at 2-3 (cited in
note 6) (stating that distinguishing between the two is necessary before a discussion of where the
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In some cases, the "rule of men" (or, as we might say today, "the
rule of individual persons") generally connotes unrestrained and
potentially arbitrary personal rule by an unconstrained and per-
haps unpredictable ruler. For present purposes, however, even
rule through law amounts to the "rule of men," if the law can be
changed unilaterally and arbitrarily, if it is largely ignored, or if
the ruler and his or her associates consistently remain above the
law.8
The same idea comes across in the list of principles suggested by Pro-
fessor Summers that, in the aggregate, make up the rule of law: The
law should be uniform, known in advance, and applicable to all.9
Offering a more positive definition, Professor Fallon sets forth a
summary of five elements that most modern scholars agree make up
the rule of law: (1) "capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles to
guide people in the conduct of their affairs"; (2) efficacy; (3) stability;
(4) supremacy of legal authority, even over government officials (in-
cluding judges); and (5) instrumentalities of impartial justice (that is,
courts that use fair procedures).0 Professor Summers's list of eighteen
principles reflects the same basic concepts." It is enough here, then, to
assume that the rule of law has both a substantive and a procedural
dimension; that there is no one in a society governed by law who is
above the law or immune from some form of legal constraint; that nei-
ther laws nor the procedures used to create or implement them should
be secret; and that the laws must not be arbitrary.
From its birth, the United States has been a country based on
written law. The Constitution of 1787 established the framework for a
rule-of-law society, through everything from the hortatory "republican
form of government" clause,'2 to the structural separation of legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial powers,3 to the specific individual protec-
tions of Article III, (trial by jury in criminal cases,' special rules for
treason cases and prohibition of corruption of blood or forfeiture ex-
tending beyond the convicted person"), and Article IV (privileges and
immunities). The Bill of Rights quickly added what would now be
called a set of recognized human rights, or individual rights, to the
largely structural original Constitution. Those amendments, especially
rule of law belongs in constitutional discourse).
8 Rosenfeld, 74 S Cal L Rev at 1313 (cited in note 6).
9 See Summers, 74 Notre Dame L Rev at 1693-95 (cited in note 6).
10 Fallon, 97 Colum L Rev at 8-9 (cited in note 6).
11 See Summers, 74 Notre Dame L Rev at 1693-95 (cited in note 6).
12 US Const Art IV, § 4.
13 US Const Arts I-111.
14 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 3.
15 US Const Art III, § 3.
16 US Const Art IV, § 2, cl 1.
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as supplemented by the Civil War amendments guaranteeing to all
citizens freedom from involuntary servitude," equal protection and
due process,8 and a racially nondiscriminatory franchise," laid the le-
gal foundation for the constitutional democracy that grew over the
years. By the time of the Second World War, the United States rightly
regarded itself as one of the champions of the rule of law, as it joined
the Allies in the war against the totalitarian regimes that controlled
Germany, Italy, and Japan.
After the War ended with the defeat of fascism and the exposure
of the horrors of the Holocaust in Europe (as well as other horrors in
Asia, such as the Rape of Nanking), it appeared that the international
community as a whole was ready to adopt the rule of law for itself.
Under the leadership of Eleanor Roosevelt, the new United Nations
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."' While the Uni-
versal Declaration did not purport to impose legally binding obliga-
tions on signatories, later conventions took that next step, including
most importantly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights2' and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights.= Other institutions were created to bring order into in-
ternational economic affairs, including the World Bank, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which was eventually folded into the
World Trade Organization in 1995), and the International Monetary
Fund. Chapter VI of the UN Charter committed all parties to attempt
to settle disputes through peaceful means, with the help if necessary of
the UN Security Council.2 Chapter VII places the responsibility for
addressing "threat[s] to the peace, breach[es] of the peace, or act[s] of
aggression"4 in the hands of the Security Council, which can authorize
the use of force to restore the peace.2 The hope, however, of the coun-
tries that signed the Charter at San Francisco in 1945, was to "save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war," "reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights," "establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law [could] be maintained," and "promote social pro-
gress and better standards of life in larger freedom."26
17 US Const Amend XIII.
18 US Const Amend XIV.
19 US Const Amend XV.
20 GA Res 217A(III), UN Doc A/810, 71 (1948).
21 GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp No 16 at 52, UN Doc A/6316 (1966).
22 GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp No 16 at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966). The
United States has not ratified this convention.
23 UN Charter, ch VI.
24 UN Charter, ch VII, art 39.
25 See UN Charter, ch VII, arts 39-42.
26 UN Charter, preamble.
[70:455
The Rule of Law in Times of Stress
As everyone knows, those hopes were short-lived. Instead of a
world free from the scourge of war, the second half of the twentieth
century saw a world threatened by the Cold War and plagued with
numerous "hot" wars. The United States was heavily involved in many
of the "hot" wars (Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf
come readily to mind), and the Cold War raised the awful prospect of
the annihilation of humanity from the first sign of the Soviet Union's
nuclear capacity in the early 1950s to the dissolution of the country
and its replacement by Russia and the other newly independent states
at the end of 1991. Today, despite the resolution of the long-standing
open hostility between the former Soviet Union and the West, the
world faces new threats; threats variously described as arising from
competing civilizations," competing cultures,8 or the revival of ancient
religious rivalries between Islam and Christianity.2 9
Where, if at all, does the rule of law fit into such a dangerous
world? Is it possible to insist on adherence to law when terrorists bra-
zenly exploit the openness of Western societies, deliberately kill thou-
sands of innocent civilians, and make clear their intent to continue to
strike at the heart of the free world? Although the risks should not be
underestimated, I believe that the rule of law not only can, but must,
continue to be the guiding star for the United States and all other
freedom-loving countries. The record of the twentieth century, as well
as the courageous example of other countries that have lived with ter-
rorism longer than the United States, should give us reason for confi-
dence. We have succeeded in the past in preserving our most precious
individual rights and our balanced form of government, and we can
continue to do so in the face of the current threats.
II. STRAINS IN THE SYSTEM
The post-September 11, 2001, period is not the first time that con-
flicts have arisen in the United States between the ideals of civil lib-
27 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
207 (Simon & Schuster 1996) ("Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of
civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale.").
28 See Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree 35 (Farrar, Straus & Giroux
1999) ("The challenge in this era of globalization-for countries and individuals-is to find a
healthy balance between preserving a sense of identity, home and community and doing what it
takes to survive within the globalization system."); Benjamin R. Barber, Jihad versus McWorld:
How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World 11 (Ballantine 1996) ("The rising eco-
nomic and communications interdependence of the world means that such nations, however uni-
fied internally, must nonetheless operate in an increasingly multicultural global environment ....
Forced into incessant contact, postmodern nations cannot sequester their idiosyncracies.").
29 See Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response
114-15 (Oxford 2002) (comparing Western and non-Western secularism and highlighting the his-
torical "threat of Christendom" to the Islamic world).
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erty and the perceived necessities of national security. The oft-cited
example of Abraham Lincoln's decision to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus during the Civil War shows one of our most respected presi-
dents struggling with just such a conflict.'° Jumping ahead fifty-five
years, the courts during World War I condoned severe restrictions on
freedom of expression, under the Espionage and Sedition Acts." More
than 2,200 people were prosecuted, and more than a thousand were
32convicted. The Supreme Court itself sustained convictions under the
Espionage Act in cases such as Schenck v United States," Frohwerk v
United States,7 and Debs v United States.31 In Abrams v United States, it
expressly upheld the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1918.-
Only after a few years had passed, and the urgency of the war had
subsided, did the Court resume its solicitude for civil liberties.
Indeed, despite the fact that World War II is remembered as the
time when Japanese-Americans were rounded up and herded into in-
ternment camps on the West Coast, and the infamous eight captured
Nazi saboteurs were tried before military tribunals -both of which
(however justified) were hardly examples of evenhanded or open
treatment of potentially dangerous persons-it is also a fact that the
Court continued throughout World War II to protect more ordinary
civil freedoms. Thus, it upheld the rights of fascist sympathizers3 and
30 Lincoln initially suspended the writ by his own action, but Chief Justice Roger Taney, sit-
ting on the Circuit Court for Maryland, in Ex parte Merryman, 17 F Cases 144, 148 (Cir Ct Md
1861), questioned the President's authority to do this without Congressional authorization.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed legislation authorizing the President's act. Act of Mar 3,
1863, 12 Stat 755. See also Duncan v Kahanamoku, 327 US 304,307-08 (1946) (noting the Gov-
ernor of Hawaii's post-Pearl Harbor decision to impose martial law and suspend the writ of ha-
beas corpus, and President Roosevelt's immediate approval).
31 Act of June 15, 1917,40 Stat 217; Act of May 16, 1918,40 Stat 553.
32 Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States 942, entry for "World
War I" (Oxford 1992) (Kermit Hall, ed).
33 249 US 47,52-53 (1919) (upholding the defendants' conviction for printing and mailing
circulars to men who had enlisted in the military, encouraging them to oppose the draft).
34 249 US 204, 209-10 (1919) (upholding the defendants' conviction for circulating a news-
paper opposing the draft).
35 249 US 211,216 (1919) (upholding a defendant's conviction for making public speeches
against the draft).
36 250 US 616, 619 (1919) (stating that the claim that the "entire Espionage Act [was] un-
constitutional because [it is] in conflict with [the First] Amendment ... [was] sufficiently dis-
cussed and negatived in Schenck ... and Frohwerk").
37 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1, 28, 24 (1942) (finding that the use of a military trial was
justified by a combination of the president's power as commander-in-chief and legislation au-
thorizing military trials of those accused of committing offenses against the law of war; also up-
holding the right of the prisoners to judicial review).
38 See Hartzel v United States, 322 US 680, 688 (1944) (overturning the Espionage Act
conviction of a fascist sympathizer who was distributing literature urging German occupation of
the United States because there was no evidence that he willfully intended to obstruct the re-
cruiting or enlistment of the U.S. military).
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Germans allegedly loyal to Adolf Hitler.39 During the same period, the
famous West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette'" decision
was handed down, in which the Court recognized the right of Jeho-
vah's Witnesses, under the First Amendment's free speech clause, to
refuse to salute the flag.' Perhaps the most impressive in this line of
decisions was the 5-4 ruling in Cramer v United States2 overturning the
treason conviction of Anthony Cramer, a naturalized citizen of Ger-
man birth who had associated with two of the German saboteurs
whose cases the Court had considered in Ex parte Quirin.3 The proof
showed that Cramer had actually met with Werner Thiel, one of the
saboteurs, had conversed with him, and had agreed to hold a substan-
tial sum of money for him. Thiel, as it turned out, was under surveil-
lance at the time of those meetings, and together with Edward Kerling
(the other saboteur) was arrested after the second meeting. Cramer
too was arrested, charged with violating the treason statute, 18 USC
§ 1, and convicted, though he was not sentenced to death. Indeed, the
trial judge commented that he thought the death penalty was inap-
propriate, because it did not appear that Cramer knew that Thiel and
Kerling had explosives or planned to destroy property in the United
States. After an exhaustive review of the law of treason, Justice Jack-
son concluded that the crime of treason consisted of two independent
elements: "adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid and com-
fort."" He rejected the idea that evidence of meetings alone would
suffice to prove aid and comfort and thus concluded-over Justice
Douglas's strong dissent-that the treason conviction had to be re-
versed. The Court had granted certiorari in 1942;" it first heard argu-
ments on March 9, 1944;6 the case was reargued on November 6, 1944;
and the decision was handed down on April 23, 1945.4'
There was obviously nothing ambiguous about the fact that the
United States was formally at war throughout the time Cramer was
before it, as well as when it decided Barnette and Quirin. What is im-
pressive is the extent to which it was willing and able to uphold the
39 See Baumgartner v United States, 322 US 665,673-74 (1944) (reversing denaturalization,
and stating that "[olne of the prerogatives of American citizenship is the right to criticize public
men and measures-and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the free-
dom to speak foolishly and without moderation").
40 319 US 624 (1943).
41 Id at 642 ("[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things
that touch the heart of the existing order.").
42 325 US 1,5 (1945).
43 317 US 1 (1942).
44 Cramer, 325 US at 29.
45 Cramer v United States, 320 US 730 (1943).
46 Cramer, 325 US at 1.
47 IA
2003]
The University of Chicago Law Review
procedural rights of even such a suspicious character as Cramer, or to
recognize the free expression rights of others who espoused unpopu-
lar or unpatriotic views. This is not to say that the Court's (or the
country's) record was unblemished during World War II from the
standpoint of the rule of law. It was not. After the shock of the Japa-
nese attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress passed a formal declaration of
war against Japan (which was later extended to the other Axis pow-
ers), pursuant to its authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of
the Constitution.8 Shortly thereafter, the President issued an Execu-
tive Order authorizing the creation of "military areas," designated by
the Secretary of War or his designee, from which anyone could be ex-
cluded." The entire Pacific Coast was so designated, and that designa-
tion led to the infamous round-up of all persons of Japanese ancestry
and various other aliens.'° In Hirabayashi v United States5' and Kore-
matsu v United States,2 the Supreme Court upheld these racially and
ethnically based measures. In more recent years, most people have
come to believe that these decisions represented a low point in the
country's record of protecting human rights and respecting individual
rights. Congress, for example, has passed resolutions providing for
compensation for the Japanese who were placed in the camps,3 and
the Supreme Court has treated those decisions as aberrations at best. 5
After World War II, fears of outright military conflict gave way to
more subtle threats to the security of the United States. On the inter-
national front, there was the Cold War with the Soviet Union, a stand-
off between two nuclear powers, either of which was capable of anni-
hilating the world. Communists in the United States were regarded as
48 J Res 116,77th Cong, 1st Sess in 55 Stat 795 (Dec 8, 1941); S J Res 119, 77th Cong, 1st
Sess in 55 Stat 796 (Dec 11, 1941); S J Res 120,77th Cong, 1st Sess in 55 Stat 797 (Dec 11, 1941).
49 Exec Ord No 9066,7 Fed Reg 1407 (1942).
50 See generally the account in Hirabayashi v United States, 320 US 81 (1943).
51 Idat 93:
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war successfully." It ex-
tends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and
progress... [I]t is not for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of [presidential and con-
gressional] action or substitute its judgment for theirs.
(citations omitted).
52 323 US 214,222 (1944) (explicitly choosing not to consider the constitutionality and va-
lidity of the statute).
53 See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-383,102 Stat 903, amended by Civil Liber-
ties Act Amendments of 1992, Pub L No 102-371,106 Stat 1167, codified at 50 USC App § 1989b
(2000). See also Wartime Relocation of Civilians, S Rep 100-202, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (Oct 20,
1987); Civil Liberties Act Amendments of 1992, S Rep 102-394, 102nd Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 8,
1992).
54 See, for example, Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas concurring) ("It is
for this reason that we must subject all racial classifications to the strictest of scrutiny, which
(aside from two decisions rendered in the midst of wartime, see Hirabayashi and Korematsu) has
proven automatically fatal.") (citations omitted).
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potential agents of the Soviet Union, and once again, the rule of law
suffered but did not disappear. The relentless campaign waged by the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, and the pursuit of sus-
pected Communists by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, is also remem-
bered now as a shameful episode. The Supreme Court was not a reli-
able restraining force. To the contrary, in cases like American Com-
munications Association v Douds," and Dennis v United States,' the
Court upheld governmental measures designed to root out Commu-
nists and prohibit individuals from either belonging to or supporting
the Communist Party. On the other hand, even Communists did not
always lose. In 1971, long before the Cold War was resolved, the Court
decided Baird v State Bar of Arizona," in which it decided that an ap-
plicant to the state bar who refused to answer the question whether
she had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any organiza-
tion that advocates the violent overthrow of the United States gov-
ernment could not be banned from bar membership for that reason.
No one opinion commanded a majority of the Court, but the result
marked an important step toward the protection of even the most un-
popular viewpoints.
The Court wasted no time after World War II was over in signal-
ing that it would not tolerate discrimination against the Japanese.
Thus, in Oyama v State of California" it found that California could
not require the escheat of certain agricultural property that a Japanese
citizen had conveyed to his son, a U.S. citizen. Had the father been
anything but Japanese, the property would have validly been trans-
ferred to the son." Under those circumstances, the Court found, the
son's equal protection rights had been violated. Similarly, in Takahashi
v Fish and Game Commission,"o the Court ruled that California could
61not deny a commercial fishing license to Japanese citizens.
On the domestic front, the decades spanning the latter half of the
twentieth century were relatively quiet, with one notable exception.
Crime became a hot political issue, at least as early as the 1968 presi-
dential campaign of Richard Nixon, who promised to restore "law and
55 339 US 382,388-89 (1950) (permitting regulations requiring labor union officials to sign
an oath swearing that they are not members of the Communist Party and they do not believe in
the overthrow of the United States government).
56 341 US 494, 501 (1951) ("reject[ing] any principle of governmental helplessness in the
face of preparation for revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to
anarchy").
-7 401 US 1 (1971). See also In re Stolar, 401 US 23 (1971); id at 10 (White dissenting from
Baird and Stolar).
58 332 US 633 (1948).
59 See id at 644.
60 334 US 410 (1948).
61 See id at 419-21.
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order" to the streets and appoint judges to the federal courts who
would not coddle criminals by, for example, enforcing their rights un-
der the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.2 On
the other hand, despite the external security threats posed by the So-
viet Union and the internal problem of crime, the decades of the 1950s
through the mid-1970s were the years when the Warren Court was ex-
panding constitutional protections of all kinds, both in the area of civil
rights and liberties and in the area of constitutional criminal proce-
dure. The case names and holdings in both areas are in many instances
just as familiar to laypersons as they are to lawyers: Brown v Board of
Education,' Miranda v Arizona,4 Gideon v Wainwright,o and Roe v
Wade,6 just to name the best-known of the group.
During the same period, the Berlin Wall was under construction;
the Cuban Missile Crisis underscored the immediacy of the military
threat that the Soviet Union was capable of presenting; American spy
planes were being shot down in hostile territory; and the United
States was scrambling to meet the Sputnik challenge. Notwithstanding
those grave reminders of the threats the country faced from abroad,
the Supreme Court was reinforcing and (many said) giving ever more
vigorous content to constitutional civil rights. Fay v Noia was argued
only two months or so after the Cuban Missile Crisis; while that deci-
sion was eventually overruled in most of its particulars by the Su-
preme Court, it had expanded the rights of state prisoners to obtain
federal habeas corpus relief for state convictions that had been ob-
tained in violation of the procedural guarantees of the federal Consti-
tution. Gideon, the famous decision that put teeth into the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel by assuring that counsel
would be available even for indigent defendants, was under advise-
ment at exactly the same time. Irvin v Dowd,8 another criminal proce-
62 See, for example, Nixon acceptance speech, delivered before the Republican National
Convention, Aug 8, 1968, in NY Times A20 (Aug 9, 1968) (promising to restore "order and re-
spect for law" since "courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as
against the criminal forces in this country").
63 347 US 483,495 (1954) (extending constitutional protection to the right to equal educa-
tion).
64 384 US 436,467 (1966) (expanding the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
from criminal court proceedings to "protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of ac-
tion is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves").
65 372 US 335, 344 (1963) (asserting that the constitutional "procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials ... cannot be realized if the poor man charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him").
66 410 US 113, 153 (1973) (anchoring the right to abortion in the "Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action").
67 372 US 391,398-99 (1963) ("Federal courts have power under the federal habeas statute
to grant relief despite the applicant's failure to have pursued a state remedy not available to him
at the time he applies.").
68 366 US 717, 728 (1961) (holding that petitioner's trial by a jury, two-thirds of which had
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dure case, overturned a capital conviction and sentence on the ground
that it was tainted by grossly unfair pretrial publicity. And, somewhat
closer to the subject of national security, in 1971 the Supreme Court
decided the Pentagon Papers6' case, which arose when the New York
Times published the first installment of a major classified document
about the development of the Vietnam War strategy. By a vote of six
to three, the Court refused the government's request for an order
permanently restraining the publication of the documents. It did so
notwithstanding the Executive Branch's representation that publica-
tion would endanger lives, that it would impede the efforts to obtain
the release of prisoners of war, and that it would stand in the way of
the peace process. Despite the existence of a de facto state of war be-
tween the United States and Vietnam, the values of the First Amend-
ment prevailed.
The lesson one can take from this history is that American insti-
tutions, and especially the courts, on balance stood firm during the
Cold War and the Vietnam War periods, and continued to protect civil
liberties. As Pentagon Papers illustrates best of all, courts did not
blindly accept restrictions on constitutional rights justified only by
broad allegations of harm to national security from the executive au-
thorities. Instead, they entertained lawsuits, balanced constitutional
rights against the claims of governmental needs, and decided each case
on an individual basis. (This does not mean, of course, that the indi-
vidual always won. In Snepp v United States,0 for example, the Court
turned aside a former CIA agent's effort to publish sensitive material
and upheld a contractual requirement of the Central Intelligence
Agency that its former employees submit proposed writings for the
agency's prepublication review, and, presumably, censorship.) The key
point, however, is that measures ensuring accountability were main-
tained in spite of the strains on the system. The question for today is
whether the country is strong enough to continue to follow the prece-
dents of the past that upheld the rule of law in the face of the most
dire risks, or if the nature of the current threats is so different that
more in the way of basic rights must be compromised.
III. PRINCIPLES To PROTECT
It would be far too much to assert that the United States has
been transformed over the short space of one year into a totalitarian,
lawless society. The question, rather, is whether any measures that
already formed opinions as to petitioner's guilt before hearing any testimony, was unconstitu-
tional).
69 New York Times Co v United States, 403 US 713 (1971).
70 444 US 507,515-16 (1980).
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have been proposed or implemented since the horrific events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, pose greater threats to the sound functioning of a so-
ciety that respects the rule of law than (1) are warranted by the degree
or immediacy of future threats to U.S. territory, U.S. citizens, or the
world in general, or (2) are compatible with the fundamental idea of
the rule of law. It is very difficult for individuals outside the restricted
circle of people who are privy to the government's most secret infor-
mation to make an informed judgment on the first of those points. All
an informed citizenry can do is to assess the information that the au-
thorities have chosen to make public, and that is otherwise in the pub-
lic domain. The comments in this Essay must therefore be taken in
that light, with one important qualification. In a democracy, those re-
sponsible for national security (principally, of course, the Executive
Branch) must do more than say "trust us, we know best," when they
are proposing significant intrusions on liberties protected by the Con-
stitution, or when they are proposing to risk American lives for a par-
ticular cause. Such a response fails almost every part of the rule of law
test, no matter whose version is being followed. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly rejected such claims.7 The public has also rejected
them, as the world saw when the Vietnam War dragged on and the
need for an American withdrawal became more apparent.2
A number of troubling propositions have been advanced as the
United States has sought a proper response to international terrorism
in all its manifestations. They include the following:
1. No aliens-whether lawfully admitted to the United States or
not-enjoy the same procedural protections under U.S. law as citizens
do.73
2. Even among U.S. citizens, racial or ethnic profiling is a legiti-
mate law enforcement tool that must be used.74
71 See, for example, Cole v Young, 351 US 536,556 (1955) (requiring that the discharge of a
government employee for threat to national security be accompanied by a determination as to
how the employee could affect national security).
72 See, for example, Clark Clifford, A Viet Nam Reappraisal, 47 Foreign Aff 601,601 (July
1969) (finding "growing impatience" and "increasing vehemence" among Americans following
stalemate in the Vietnam conflict); Tom Wicker, Vietcong's Attacks Shock Washington, NY Times
Al (Feb 2, 1968) (indicating that the Vietcong's Tet Offensive contradicted Johnson administra-
tion claims that the "war was being won").
73 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Right and Wrong, NY Times A27 (Nov 24,2001) (call-
ing the sweep of possible military tribunals "extraordinary" because they apply not only to non-
resident aliens, but also to "millions of resident aliens in this country; people with green cards").
74 Ann Coulter, Bush Pays Homage to the Rituals of Liberalism, TownHall.com (June 20,
2002), online at http://www.townhall.comlcolumnists/anncoulter/ac20020620.shtml (visited Dec 2,
2002) (asserting that "[FBI head] Mueller should be fired for demanding that FBI agents
chastely ignore religion and nationality when investigating terrorism"). See also Jason L. Riley,
'Racial Profiling' and Terrorism, Wall St J A22 (Oct 24, 2001) (identifying racial profiling as a
"patriotic endeavor"); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling Also Has a Good Side, Newsday A38
(Sept 25, 2001) (suggesting "profiling may not be the bogyman that it was so recently branded
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3. Personal privacy, whether with respect to telephone calls,
homes, conversations at a restaurant, or otherwise, is a luxury that
must be sacrificed, so that intelligence-gathering activities can be con-
ducted more efficiently."
4. Public hearings and legal representation are no longer appro-
priate for arrestees suspected of terrorist activities, even though such
devices may reduce risks of error.'
6
5. Institutions not under the control of the Executive Branch are
inadequate for the adjudication of charges against suspected terrorists,
particularly (but not exclusively) those not of U.S. citizenship."
These are powerful assertions, and each in its own way poses a signifi-
cant threat to the continued observance of the rule of law. Let us re-
turn again to the list Professor Fallon offered, set out above.
The first point about the rule of law is that the law must have the
capacity to guide people in their actions. Encompassed within this is
the notion that law must be transparent (publicly available, knowable)
and nonarbitrary. Secret rules, applied in secret, fail this criterion.
There is no assurance that similar cases will be treated similarly, nor is
there any way to know in advance what standards will be used. One
crucial aspect of the kind of even-handedness we expect of law is that
it refrain from discrimination on the basis of characteristics like race,
sex, national origin, religion, and ethnicity. This norm has been at the
heart of the American conception of the rule of law for a century and
a half; it is reflected in the many international agreements on the sub-
ject of human rights to which the United States has adhered; and it
should be sacrificed, if at all, only in the most controlled manner, and
only for the most powerful of reasons.
The second criterion that the rule of law must reflect is efficacy.
On that point, and on that point alone, one can make a reasonable ar-
gument that giving unfettered discretion to the Executive Branch is
perfectly acceptable. If police can search any house they want, for
whatever reason they want; if they can tap any telephone; if they can
arrest and detain as many material witnesses for as long as it is con-
venient without being bothered by hearings before magistrates, anx-
and can no longer be so easily dismissed as even racist").
75 Lisa Guernsey, Living under an Electronic Eye, NY Times G1 (Sept 27, 2001) (noting
that people have often responded to national crises with willingness to reduce personal privacy,
and now surveillance measures are expanding to include electronic media).
76 Steve Strunsky, Where Towers Cast Shadows Another Loss, NY Times § 14NJ at 1 (July
28, 2002) (highlighting the response of some parts of the public that although secret detention
and trials of detainees lead to diminished rights, they still support the measures in light of 9/11).
77 See David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Civil Liberties; President Defends Military
Tribunals in Terrorist Cases, NY Times Al (Nov 30,2001) (noting Bush's portrayal of the tribu-
nals as "necessary byproducts of America's wartime footing"). See also President Issues Military
Order (cited in note 4).
2003]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ious family members, public-interest lawyers, or other meddlers, then
the system for gathering information would be unfettered by pesky
rules. Sooner or later, useful information is likely to turn up, and per-
haps it will help in preventing the next round of terrorist attacks. But
who wants to live in a state like that? Such a world would squash the
individual autonomy and freedom that has led to the creativity, flexi-
bility, and confidence typical of Americans.
The only kind of stability (moving to the third characteristic of
the rule of law) that would be fostered in such a regime is the stability
of totalitarianism. To an impressive degree, the societies of Stalin, Tito,
and Castro were or are quite stable, but few in the United States
would describe them as rule-of-law societies. The kind of stability one
wants, in short, does not come from the end of a police baton or a mili-
tary rifle; it comes from the consent of the governed, freely given.
The fourth criterion -supremacy of the law above all individuals,
from the President, to the Supreme Court, to others in government, to
the rest of the population -is by definition not satisfied by a system
that places executive power above all else. Despite the occasional ab-
erration, this is not what the United States has done in the past. To the
contrary, in two landmark rulings the Supreme Court has emphasized
that even the President is not above the law: United States v Nixon8
and Clinton v Jones.9 And in its own turn, the Supreme Court is also
subject to legal correction. When it construes a federal statute in a way
that is inconsistent with congressional desires, the Congress can and
does overrule the Court legislatively.'° If the Court has rendered a
constitutional decision, it is obviously much harder to overrule it, but
even that has happened from the start, as the story of Chisholm v
Georgia and the Eleventh Amendment illustrates.8 The old Latin
78 418 US 683, 707 (1974) (enforcing the special prosecutor's subpoena to produce the
White House tapes and rejecting the president's claim of absolute immunity, stemming in part
from his responsibility for foreign affairs and national defense).
79 520 US 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding that presidential immunity does not create a cate-
gorical bar to litigation against a sitting president).
80 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is a good example. It was passed expressly to overrule the
Court's decisions in Ward's Cove Packing Co, Inc v Atonio, 490 US 642, 651-52 (1989) (rejecting
non-white cannery workers' claim for disparate impact of hiring and promotion practices based
on a comparison of the racial composition of the skilled and unskilled workforce at a particular
salmon cannery), and Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 171 (1989) (holding that
"racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under [42 USC]
1981").
81 2 US (2 Dall) 419 (1793).
82 Briefly, the Court allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue the State of Georgia in
Chisholm. See id at 478. Congress immediately put before the states, and the states ratified, the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which withdrew that branch of jurisdiction from Arti-
cle III, and which has since been interpreted by the Supreme Court as a reflection of the funda-
mental sovereignty the States retained when they joined the Union. See, for example, Seminole
Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 (1996) (asserting that the Eleventh Amendment "pre-
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question "quis custodiet illos custodiens" (who guards the guardians)
implies the answer that must be given in a society that relies on law
rather than on individuals: Someone must be guarding the guardians,
or else ultimately there is nothing but the rule of men.n
Last is the need for impartial and independent courts that can
serve as neutral arbiters of disputes both among private individuals
and between individuals and their government. Secret tribunals with
unknown procedural rules, staffed by persons with ultimate loyalty ei-
ther to the military or to the chief executive, are in no way the equiva-
lent of such independent tribunals. Indeed, in years past the United
States itself has criticized other countries for using exactly such tribu-
nals."' The great due process decisions from the Supreme Court, in-
cluding notably Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v McGrath," de-
cided during the height of the frenzy over Communism in the early
years of the Cold War (indeed, in the very year that Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg were convicted of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act
by giving secret information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Un-
ion'), take quite a different tack. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee, the Court held that the act of listing three organizations on the
Attorney General's list of "subversive organizations" without giving
them a hearing violated their constitutional rights." Later decisions,
such as Mathews v Eldridge,8 emphasize the role that due process pro-
tections play in reducing the risk of erroneous decisions and balancing
the private interests of the individual against the public interests of
the state. 8 Without open and impartial courts, none of that can take
place.
CONCLUSION
The message from history-and particularly the history of the
United States from the end of World War II to the present- is that the
rule of law can be upheld even during times of stress. Even though the
suppos[es] that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system," and inherent in that
sovereignty is immunity).
83 Indeed, according to Justice Story, "[Qjuis custodiet custodes? The answer is found in
the constitution." Briscoe v Bank of Kentucky, 36 US (1 Pet) 257, 348 (1837).
84 See for example Shaila K. Dewan, New Yorker Imprisoned in Peru Gets New Trial in
Treason Case, NY Times Al (Aug 29,2000) (quoting a State Department spokesman on the de-
partment's concerns that the secret military tribunal in Peru that convicted New Yorker Lori
Berenson of treason did not accord her due process).
85 341 US 123 (1951).
86 For a decision at the very end of the legal proceedings against the Rosenbergs, see
Rosenberg v United States, 346 US 273 (1953).
87 341 US at 141-42.
88 424 US 319 (1976).
89 Id at 334 ("Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.") (citations omitted).
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Supreme Court and other governmental institutions did not always
live up to society's highest aspirations, many of the lapses from the
rule of law (such as the Japanese internments) are now widely re-
garded as shameful episodes that should never be repeated. Living
under the rule of law may call for courage at times, as any citizen of
Israel or Northern Ireland could affirm. Even in the United States this
was necessary during the often-tense battle to ensure civil rights in the
states of the old Confederacy. Jack Bass's account of the federal
judges who upheld the Supreme Court's decisions forbidding dis-
crimination on the basis of race is an inspiring tale of strong and
committed patriots who were determined to live under rules of law
rather than the rules of the street or lynch mob." The same kind of
courage will be necessary for all citizens now: postal workers, com-
muters on trains, airline pilots and their passengers,. and people living
their daily lives.
What they will be protecting, however, when they insist on con-
tinued adherence to the rule of law, is the very essence of the United
States. The rule of law becomes more vital, not less so, when democ-
racy is attacked. As President Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in his
first Inaugural Address, "[t]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself."
We do not need to fear the perceived shackles on government power
that the rule of law imposes. They are not shackles at all; they are in-
stead agreed constraints on the power of any particular officials or in-
dividuals, so that any measures that are necessary are seen to be, and
are in fact, evenhanded, nondiscriminatory, subject to testing for accu-
racy, and transparent. Enemies-foreign and domestic-have been
conquered effectively in the past without sacrificing everything that
has made the United States a country with a strong record of exempli-
fying the rule of law. Those same enemies, in whatever guise they take
in the future, can still be foiled in the same way.
90 See generally Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (Alabama 1990).
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